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ABSTRACT
Today’s social media platforms enable to spread both authentic and
fake news very quickly. Some approaches have been proposed to
automatically detect such “fake” news based on their content, but it
is difficult to agree on universal criteria of authenticity (which can
be bypassed by adversaries once known). Besides, it is obviously
impossible to have each news item checked by a human.
In this paper, we a mechanism to limit the spread of fake news
which is not based on content. It can be implemented as a plugin on
a social media platform. The principle is as follows: a team of fact-
checkers reviews a small number of news items (the most popular
ones), which enables to have an estimation of each user’s inclina-
tion to share fake news items. Then, using a Bayesian approach,
we estimate the trustworthiness of future news items, and treat
accordingly those of them that pass a certain “untrustworthiness”
threshold.
We then evaluate the effectiveness and overhead of this tech-
nique on a large Twitter graph. We show that having a few thou-
sands users exposed to one given news item enables to reach a very
precise estimation of its reliability. We thus identify more than 99%
of fake news items with no false positives. The performance impact
is very small: the induced overhead on the 90th percentile latency is
less than 3%, and less than 8% on the throughput of user operations.
1 INTRODUCTION
The expression “fake news” has become very popular after the
2016 presidential election in the United States. Both political sides
accused each other of spreading false information on social media,
in order to influence public opinion. Fake news have also been
involved in Brexit and seem to have played a crucial role in the
French election. The phenomenon is considered by many as a threat
to democracy, since the proportion of people getting their news
from social media is significantly increasing [1].
Facebook and Google took a first concrete measure by removing
advertising money from websites sharing a significant number of
fake news [2]. This, however, does not apply to websites that do
not rely on such money: popular blogs, non-professional streaming
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channels, or media relying on donations, to name a few. Facebook
also considered labeling some news items as “disputed” when inde-
pendent human fact-checkers contest their reliability [3]. However,
there cannot be enough certified human fact-checkers for a world-
wide social network. While it is very easy to share fake news, it
may take very long to check them, clearly too long to prevent them
from getting viral.
We present Credulix, the first content-agnostic system to pre-
vent fake news from getting viral. From a software perspective,
Credulix is a plugin to a social media platform. From a more ab-
stract perspective, it can also be viewed as a vaccine for the social
network. Assuming the system has been exposed to some (small)
amount of fake news in the past, Credulix enables it to prevent fu-
ture fake news from becoming viral. It is important to note that our
approach does not exclude other (e.g. content-based) approaches,
but complements them.
At the heart of our approach lies a simple but powerful Bayesian
result we prove in this paper, estimating the credibility of news
items based onwhich users shared them and how these users treated
fake news in the past. News items considered fake with a sufficiently
high probability can then be prevented from further dissemination,
i.e., from becoming viral.
Our Bayesian result is in the spirit of Condorcet’s jury Theorem
[26], which states that a very high level of reliability can be achieved
by a large number of weakly reliable individuals. To determine the
probability of falsehood of a news item X, we look at the behavior
of users towards X. This particular behavior had a certain a priori
probability to happen. We compute this probability, based on what
we call user credulity records: records of which fact-checked items
users have seen and shared. Then, after determining the average
fraction of fake news on the social network, we apply Laplace’s
Rule of Succession [73] and then Bayes’ Theorem [45] to obtain the
desired probability.
Credulix does retain the idea of using a team of certified human
fact-checkers. However, we acknowledge that they cannot review
all news items. Such an overwhelming task would possibly require
even more fact-checkers than users. Here, the fact-checkers only
check a few viral news items, i.e., ideally news items that have
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been shared and seen the most on the social network1. Many such
fact-checking initiatives already exist all around the world [6–10].
Such checks enable us to build user credulity records. Our Bayesian
formula determines the probability that a given news item is fake
using the records of users who viewed or shared it. When this prob-
ability goes beyond a threshold (say 99.9999%), the social network
can react accordingly. E.g., it may stop showing the news item in
other users’ news feeds. It is important to note that our approach
does not require any users to share a large amount of fake news. It
suffices that some users share more fake news than others.
Our approach is generic in the sense that it does not depend
on any specific criteria. Here, for instance, we look at what users
share to determine if a news item is fake. However, the approach
is independent of the precise meanings of “share” and “fake”: they
could respectively be replaced by (“like” or “report”) and (“funny”,
“offensive”, “politically liberal" or “politically conservative”).
Turning the theory behind Credulix into a system deployable
in practice is a non-trivial task. In this paper we address these
challenges as well. In particular, we present a practical approach to
computing news item credibility in a fast, incremental manner.
We implementCredulix as a standalone Java plugin and connect
it to Twissandra [22] (an open source Twitter clone), which serves
as a baseline system. Credulix interferes very little with the critical
path of users’ operations and thus has a minimal impact on user
request latency. We evaluate Credulix in terms of its capacity
to detect fake news as well as its performance overhead when
applied to a real social network of over 41M users [49]. After fact-
checking the 1024 most popular news items (out of a total of over
35M items), over 99% of unchecked fake news items are correctly
detected by Credulix. We also show that Credulix does not incur
significant overhead in terms of throughput and latency of user
operations (sharing items and viewing the news feed): average
latency increases by atmost 5%, while average throughput decreases
by at most 8%.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoret-
ical principles behind Credulix. Section 3 presents the design and
implementation of Credulix. Section 4 reports on our evaluation
results. Section 5 discusses the limitations and tradeoffs posed by
Credulix. Section 6 discusses related work and Section 7 concludes.
2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
In this section we give an intuition of the theoretical result underly-
ingCredulix, followed by its formalization as a theorem.We finally
show how to restate the problem in a way that allows efficient, fast
computation of news item credibility.
2.1 Intuition
The context is a social network where users can post news items,
such as links to newspapers or blog articles. Users exposed to these
1Some news items are indeed seen by millions, and are easy to check a posteriori. For
instance, according to CNN [4], the following fake news items were read by millions:
“Thousands of fraudulent ballots for Clinton uncovered” ; “Elizabeth Warren endorsed
Bernie Sanders” ; “The NBA cancels 2017 All-Star Game in North Carolina”. According to
BuzzFeed [5], the fake news item “Obama Signs Executive Order Banning The Pledge Of
Allegiance In Schools Nationwide” got more than 2 millions engagements on Facebook,
and “Pope Francis ShocksWorld, Endorses Donald Trump for President, Releases Statement”
almost 1 million.
Fact-checked news items
No. viewed/shared/true/fake 
news items for each user
Global fraction 
of fake news
Behavioral model of users exposed to X
News item X
Probability that X is fake
Figure 1: News item falsehood probability computation.
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Prob share true
X probably fake
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NO SHARE
Figure 2: Users reacting to new item X .
news items can in turn share them with other users (Twitter follow-
ers, Facebook friends etc.). The social network has a fact-checking
team whose role is to determine whether certain news items are
fake (according to some definition of fake)2. The news items that
the fact-checking team needs to check is very low compared to the
total number of items in the social network.
The Main Steps. Our approach goes through the following three
main steps:
(1) The fact-checking team reviews few news items (ideally
those that have been the most viral ones in the past). This is
considered the ground truth in our context.
(2) Credulix creates a probabilistic model of each user’s sharing
behavior based on their reactions (share / not share) to the
fact-checked items in Step (1). This captures the likelihood
of a user to share true (resp. fake) news items.
(3) For a new, unchecked news item X , we use the behavior
models generated in Step (2) to determine the probability
that X is fake, based on who viewed and shared X .
A high-level view of our technique is depicted in Figure 1. We
use a Bayesian approach. For example, if an item is mostly shared
by users with high estimated probabilities of sharing fake items,
while users with high estimated probabilities of sharing true items
rarely share it, we consider the item likely to be fake (Figure 2).
Preventing the Spread of Fake News. Once we estimate the
probability of a news item X being fake, preventing its spread
becomes easy. Let p0 be any cutoff probability threshold. Each time
a user views or shares X , we compute p, the probability of X being
fake, which we detail below. If p ≥ p0 (i.e., X has a probability at
least p0 to be fake), Credulix stops showing X in the news feed of
users, preventing X from spreading and becoming viral.
2.2 Basic Fake News Detection
User Behavior.We model the behavior of a user u using the two
following probabilities:
2Our truth and falsehood criteria here are as good as the fact-checking team.
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• PT (u): probability that u shares a news item if it is true.
• PF (u): probability that u shares a news item if it is fake.
The probabilities PT (u) and PF (u) are assumed to be independent
between users. In practice, this is the case if the decision to share a
news item X is mainly determined by X itself.
We obtain estimates of PT (u) and PF (u) for each user based
on the user’s behavior (share / not share) with respect to fact-
checked items. For any given user u, let vT (u) (resp. sT (u)) de-
note the number of fact-checked true news items viewed (resp.
shared) by u, and vF (u) (resp. sF (u)) the number of fact-checked
fake news items viewed (resp. shared) by u. We call the tuple
(vT (u), sT (u),vF (u), sF (u)) the User Credulity Record (UCR) of u.
User behavior has been modeled similarly in prior work, for
instance, in Curb [44]. In Curb, users exposed to a news item decide
probabilistically whether to share it, potentially exposing all their
followers to it. Curb relies on very similar metrics, namely the num-
bers of viewed and shared items for each user, and the probabilities
that users would share true or false news items.
For any given user u, we define the following functions, based
on the UCR:
• β1(u) = (sT (u) + 1)/(vT (u) + 2)
• β2(u) = (sF (u) + 1)/(vF (u) + 2)
• β3(u) = (vT (u) − sT (u) + 1)/(vT (u) + 2)
• β4(u) = (vF (u) − sF (u) + 1)/(vF (u) + 2)
According to Laplace’s Rule of Succession [73], we have PT (u) =
β1(u) and PF (u) = β2(u).
Probability of aNews ItemBeing Fake.At the heart of Credulix
lies a formula to compute the likelihood of a new (not fact-checked)
news item X to be fake. Let V and S be any two sets of users that
have viewed and shared X , respectively. The probability that X is
fake, p(V , S) is computed as:
p(V , S) = дπF (V , S)/(дπF (V , S) + (1 − д)πT (V , S)) (1)
Where:
• πT (V , S) =∏u ∈S β1(u)∏u ∈V−S β3(u)
• πF (V , S) =∏u ∈S β2(u)∏u ∈V−S β4(u), and
• д is the estimated global fraction of fake news items in the
social network, with д ∈ (0, 1).
д can be estimated by fact-checking a set of news items picked
uniformly at random from the whole social network. Let д∗ be
the real fraction of fake news items in the social network. We
distinguish two cases: д∗ is known, and д∗ is unknown. If д∗ is
known, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let д = д∗. A news item viewed by a set of users V
and shared by a set of users S is fake with probability p(V , S).
Proof. Consider a news item X that has not been fact-checked.
Consider the following events:
E : X viewed by a set of users V and shared by a set of users S .
F : X is fake.
T : X is true.
Our goal is to evaluate P(F |E): the probability that X is fake
knowing E.
• If X is true, the probability of E is P(E |T ) =∏
u ∈S PT (u)
∏
u ∈V−S (1 − PT (u)) = πT (V , S).
• If X is fake, the probability of E is P(E |F ) =∏
u ∈S PF (u)
∏
u ∈V−S (1 − PF (u)) = πF (V , S).
The probability that X is fake (independently of E) is P(F ) = д∗,
and the probability that X is true (independently of E) is P(T ) =
1 − д∗.
Thus, we can determine the probability that E is true: P(E) =
P(E |T )P(T ) + P(E |F )P(F ) = (1 − д∗)πT (V , S) + д∗πF (V , S).
P(F |E) = P(E |F )P(F )/P(E) according to Bayes’ Theorem [45].
Then, P(F |E) = д∗πF (V , S)/(д∗πF (V , S)+(1−д∗)πT (V , S)) = p(V , S).
Thus, the result. □
If д∗ is unknown, we assume that д is a lower bound of д∗. We
get in this case the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For д ≤ д∗, a news item viewed by a set of users V
and shared by a set of users S is fake with probability at least p(V , S).
Proof. First, note that πT (V , S) and πF (V , S) are strictly positive
by definition. Thus, the ratio πT (V , S)/πF (V , S) is always strictly
positive.
∀x ∈ (0, 1), let д(x) = xπF (V , S)/(xπF (V , S) + (1 − x)πT (V , S)).
Then, p(V , S) = h(д), and according to Theorem 1, the news item
is fake with probability h(д∗).
Written differently, д(x) = 1/(1 + k(x)), with k(x) = (1/x −
1)πT (V , S)/πF (V , S).
As д ≤ д∗, 1/д ≥ 1/д∗, 1 + k(д) ≥ 1 + k(д∗) and h(д) ≤ h(д∗).
Thus, the result. □
2.3 Fast Fake News Detection
Credulix’ measure of credibility of a news itemX is the probability
p(V , S) thatX is fake. An obvious way to compute this probability is
to recalculate p(V , S) using eq. (1) each time X is viewed or shared
by a user. Doing so, however, would be very expensive in terms of
computation. Below, we show an efficient method for computing
news item credibility. We first describe the computation of UCRs,
and then present our fast, incremental approach for computing
news item credibility using item ratings and UCR scores. This is
crucial for efficiently running Credulix in practice.
Computing User Credulity Records (UCRs). Recall that the
four values (vT (u), sT (u), vF (u), sF (u)) constituting a UCR only
concern fact-checked news items. We thus update the UCR of useru
(increment one of these four values) in the following two scenarios.
(1) When u views or shares a news item that has been fact-
checked (i.e., is known to be true or fake).
(2) Upon fact-checking a news item that u had been exposed to.
In general, the more fact-checked news items a user u has seen
and shared, the moremeaningful u’s UCR. Users who have not been
exposed to any fact-checked items cannot contribute to Credulix.
Item Rating. In addition to p(V , S), we introduce another measure
of how confident Credulix is about X being fake: the item rating
α(V , S), whose role is equivalent to that of p(V , S). We define it as
α(V , S) = πT (V , S)/πF (V , S), V and S being the sets of users that
viewed and shared X , respectively. If we also define α0 = (1/p0 −
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4
Figure 3: CREDULIX’ share operation.
1)/(1/д−1) as the rating threshold corresponding to the probability
threshold p0, then, p(V , S) ≥ p0 is equivalent to α(V , S) ≤ α0.
We have p(V , S) = дπF (V , S)/(дπF (V , S) + (1 − д)πT (V , S)) =
д/(д + (1 − д)(πT (V , S)/πF (V , S))) = д/(д + (1 − д)α(V , S)). We
have p(V , S) ≥ p0 if and only if д/p(V , S) ≤ д/p0, that is: д + (1 −
д)α(V , S) ≤ д/p0, which is equivalent to α(V , S) ≤ (1/p0−1)/(1/д−
1), that is: α(V , S) ≤ α0.
When the item X with α(V , S) ≤ α0 is about to be displayed in
a user’s news feed, Credulix suppresses X . Note that α0 can be a
fixed constant used throughout the system, but may also be part of
the account settings of each user, giving users the ability to control
how “confident” the system needs to be about the falsehood of an
item before suppressing it.
According to the definition of πT (V , S) and πF (V , S), each timeX
is viewed (resp. shared) by a new user u, we can update X ’s rating
α(V , S) by multiplying it by γv (u) = β1(u)/β2(u) (resp. γs (u) =
β3(u)/β4(u)). We call γv (u) and γs (u) respectively the view score
and share score of u’s UCR, as their value only depends on u’s UCR.
Consequently, when a user views or shares X , we only need to
access a single UCR in order to update the rating of X . This is
what allows Credulix to update news item credibility fast, without
recomputing eq. (1) each time the item is seen by a user.
In what follows, we refer to γv (u) and γs (u) as u’s UCR score.
The more a UCR score differs from 1, the stronger its influence on
an item rating (which is computed as a product of UCR scores). We
consider a UCR score to be useful if it is different from 1.
3 CREDULIX AS A SOCIAL MEDIA PLUGIN
Credulix can be seen as a plugin to an existing social network, like,
for instance, Facebook’s translation feature. The translator observes
the content displayed to users, translating it from one language
to another. Similarly, Credulix observes news items about to be
displayed to users and tags or suppresses those considered fake.
User U
View news feed
Get U news 
feed item IDs…
Items Data Store
Get items
CREDULIX
Return filtered items
Store new ratings
U news feed items
BASELINE NEWS VIEWING CREDULIX NEWS VIEWING
3
1
X1
Xn 2
Filter items
Update
ratings if items 
are tracked
4
5
Figure 4: CREDULIX’ view operation.
Despite the fast computtation described in Section 2.3, there
are still notable challenges posed by turning an algorithm into a
practical system. In order for the Credulix plugin to be usable in
practice, it must not impair user experience. In particular, its impact
on the latency and throughput of user operations (retrieving news
feeds or tweeting/sharing articles) must be small. Our design is
motivated by minimizing Credulix’ system resource overhead.
Selective Item Tracking. Every second, approximately 6000 new
tweets appear on Twitter and 50000 new posts are created on Face-
book [11, 12]. Monitoring the credibility of all these items would
pose significant resource overhead. With Credulix, each view /
share event requires an additional update to the news item’s meta-
data. However, we do not need to keep track of all the items in the
system, but just the ones that show a potential of becoming viral.
Credulix requires each item’s metadata to contain an additional
bit indicating whether that item is tracked. The rating of item X is
only computed and kept up to date by Credulix if X is tracked.
We set the tracked bit for item X when X is shared by an influ-
ential user. We define influential users as users who have a high
number of followers. The intuition behind this approach is that a
news item is more likely to become viral if it is disseminated by a
well-connected user [43]. The follower threshold necessary for a
user to be considered influential is a system parameter. It can be
chosen, for instance, as an absolute threshold on the number of
followers or relatively to the other users (e.g., the first n most pop-
ular users are influential). There are many methods to determine
influential users [25, 34, 35, 50, 57, 66, 67] or the likelihood of items
to become viral [27, 39, 40, 51, 55, 68, 71, 72]. For simplicity, in our
experiments we consider the 5% most popular users influential.
Interaction with the Social Media Platform.We consider two
basic operations a user u can perform:
• Sharing a news item and
• Viewing her own news feed.
Sharing is the operation of disseminating a news item to all of u’s
followers (e.g., tweeting, sharing, updating Facebook status etc.).
Viewing is the action of refreshing the news feed, to see new posts
shared by users that u follows. In the following, we describe how
these operations are performed in a social network platform (in-
spired by Twitter) without Credulix (Baseline) and with Credulix.
We assume that, like in Twitter, all users’ news feeds are repre-
sented as lists of item IDs and stored in memory, while the item
contents are stored in an item data store [13].
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Baseline Sharing. A schema of the Share operation is shown in
Figure 3. The regular flow of the operation is shown in blue and
Credulix is shown in orange. User u shares an itemX (1). First, the
social graph is queried to retrieveu’s followers (2). The system then
appends the ID of X to the news feeds of u’s followers (3). Finally,
if X is a new item, the body of X is stored in a data store (4).
Sharing withCredulix. Ifu is not an influential user, the flow of
the share operation described above stays the same. Ifu is influential,
we mark X as tracked and associate an item rating with X , because
we expect X to potentially become viral. If X is tracked, Credulix
updates the rating ofX usingu’s UCR share score. Thus, for tracked
items, Credulix may require one additional write to the data store
compared to the Baseline version, in order to store the updated
item rating. This is done off the critical path of the user request,
hence not affecting request latency.
Baseline News Feed Viewing. A schema of the View operation
is shown in Figure 4. User u requests her news feed (1). For each
item ID in u’s news feed (stored in memory), the system retrieves
the corresponding item body from the data store (2) and sends all
of them back to the user (3).
Viewing News Feed with Credulix. Credulix augments the
View operation in two ways. First, after the news feed articles
are retrieved from the data store, Credulix checks the ratings of
the items, filtering out the items with a high probability of being
fake. Second, if u’s news feed contains tracked items, Credulix
updates the rating of those items using u’s UCR view score. Hence,
a supplementary write to the data store is necessary, compared to
the Baseline version, for storing the items’ updated ratings. Again,
we do this in the background, not impacting user request latency.
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our implementation of Credulix as a
stand-alone Java plugin. We implement a Twitter clone where the
share and view operation executions are depicted in Figures 3 and 4.
We refer to the Twitter clone as Baseline and we compare it to the
variant with Credulix plugged in, which we call Credulix. For
the data store of the Baseline we use Twissandra’s data store [22],
running Cassandra version 2.2.9 [19].
The goals of our evaluation are the following. First, we explore
Credulix’s fake news detecting efficiency. Second, we measure the
performance overhead of our implementation. More precisely, we
show that:
(1) Credulix efficiently stops the majority of fake news from be-
coming viral, with no false positives. Credulix reduces the
number of times a viral fake news item is viewed from hun-
dreds of millions to hundreds of thousands (in Section 4.2).
(2) Credulix succeeds in stopping the majority of fake news
from becoming viral for various user behaviors in terms of
how likely users are to share news items they are exposed
to (in Section 4.3).
(3) Credulix’s impact on system performance is negligible for
both throughput and latency (in Section 4.4).
4.1 Experimental Setup
We perform our evaluation using a real Twitter graph of over 41M
users [49]. We consider users to be influential (as defined in Sec-
tion 3) if they are among the 5% most followed users. We use a set
of tweets obtained by crawling Twitter to get a distribution of item
popularity. Out of over 35M tweets we crawled, the 1024 (0.003%)
most popular tweets are retweeted almost 90 million times, which
corresponds to over 16% of all the retweets.
Two key values influence Credulix’ behavior:
• r: The number of fact-checked news items during UCR cre-
ation (i.e., the number of news items constituting the ground
truth). In our experiments we use a value of r = 1024, which
causes one third of the user population to have useful UCR
scores (more than enough for reliable fake item detection).
• msp: The max share probability models users’ intrinsic shar-
ing behavior: how likely users are to share news items they
are exposed to. This models how users react to news items.
It is not a system parameter of Credulix. We expect msp to
be different for different news items, as some items become
viral (high msp) and some do not (low msp). Regardless of
what the real value of msp is, Credulix effectively prevents
fake items from going viral, as we show later.
While the network and the tweets come from real datasets, we
generate the user behavior (i.e., probability to share fake and true
news items), as we explain in the remainder of this section. We
proceed in two steps.
(1) UCR creation: determining the UCR (i.e., vT , sT ,vF , sF ) for
each user based on propagation of fact-checked news items.
(2) Fake item detection: using the UCRs obtained in the previous
step, we use Credulix to detect fake news items and stop
them from spreading.
This two-step separation is only conceptual. In a production system,
both UCR creation and fake item detection happen continuously
and concurrently.
UCR Creation. For each user u, we set PT (u) and PF (u) (see Sec-
tion 2) to values chosen uniformly at random between 0 and msp.
The likelihood of a user to share true or fake news is the main
user characteristic used by Credulix. This approach yields differ-
ent types of user behavior. We take a subset of r tweets from our
tweet dataset and consider this subset the ground truth, randomly
assigning truth values to news items.
To create the UCRs, we propagate r items through the social
graph. We assign each of the r items a target share count, which
corresponds to its number of retweets in our dataset. The propa-
gation proceeds by exposing a random user u to the propagated
item X and having u decide (based on PT (u) and PF (u)) whether to
share X or not. If u shares X , we show X to all u’s followers that
have not yet seen it. During item propagation, we keep track of
how many true/fake items each user has seen/shared and update
the UCRs accordingly.
We repeat this process until one of the following conditions is
fulfilled:
(1) The target number of shares is reached.
(2) At least 80% of users have been exposed to X , at which point
we consider the network saturated.
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Fake Item Detection. After creating the UCRs, we measure how
effectively these can be leveraged to detect fake news. To this end,
in the second step of the evaluation, we propagate tweets through
the social graph. One such experiment consists of injecting an item
in the system, by making a random useru share it. The propagation
happens as in the previous phase, with two important differences:
(1) Since in this second step the item we propagate is not fact-
checked, we do not update u’s UCR. Instead, whenever u
is exposed to an item, we update that item’s rating using
u’s UCR score. We use the share score if u shares the item,
otherwise we use the view score (see Section 2).
(2) We only propagate the item once, continuing until the prop-
agation stops naturally, or until the probability of an item
being fake reaches p0 = 0.999999.
We repeat this experiment 500 times with a fake news item and 500
times with a true news item to obtain the results presented later in
this section.
We conduct the experiments on a 48-core machine, with four
12-core Intel Xeon E7-4830 v3 processors operating at 2.1 GHz, 512
GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 16.04.
4.2 Stopping Fake News from Becoming Viral
This experiment presents the end-to-end impact of
Credulix on the number of times users are exposed to fake news.
To this end, we measure the number of times a user is exposed to a
fake news item in two scenarios:
(1) Baseline propagation of fake news items.
(2) Propagation of fake items, where we stop propagating an
item when Credulix labels it as fake with high probability.
Figure 5 conveys results for items with varying rates of virality,
modeled by our msp parameter. It shows howmany times a user has
been exposed to a fake item, cumulatively over the total number
of fake items that we disseminate. We can see that regardless of
how viral the items would naturally become, Credulix is able to
timely detect the fake items before they spread to too many users.
Credulix restricts the number of views from hundreds of millions
to tens or hundreds of thousands.
None of our experiments encountered false positives (i.e., true
items being incorrectly labeled as fake). Considering the increas-
ing responsibility being attributed to social network providers as
mediators of information, it is crucial that true news items are not
accidentally marked as fake.
4.3 Fake News Detection Relative to Sharing
Probability
In Figure 6 we plot the percentage of fake items displayed with
Credulix for two graph sizes. On a smaller graph of 1M users
generated with the SNAP generator [52], Credulix achieves a
lower fake item detection rate. This is because the impact of fact-
checked items is smaller on a small graph, leading to fewer users
with relevant UCR scores. This result suggests that on a real social
graph that is larger than the one we use, Credulix would be more
efficient than in our experiments.
Figure 6 also shows how the detection rate depends on the ten-
dency of users to share news items (that we model using msp). The
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Figure 5: Fake news spreading with CREDULIX, as a func-
tion of msp (lower is better). For low msp, news items do not
become viral. For high msp, CREDULIX blocks the majority
of fake news items.
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Figure 6: Fake news spreading with CREDULIX, as a func-
tion of msp, for different social graph sizes (lower is better).
more viral the items get (the higher the msp value), the more effec-
tive Credulix becomes at fake item detection. Intuitively, the more
items users share, the more precisely we are able to estimate their
sharing behavior. The lower detection rate for small msp values
does not pose a problem in practice, as a low msp also means that
items naturally do not become viral.
While not visible in the plot, it is worth noting that not only
the relative amount of viewed fake items decreases, but also the
absolute one. For example, while for msp = 1/32 a fake news item
has been displayed almost 3k times (out of over 84k for Baseline),
for msp= 1/16 a fake item has only been displayed 1.2k times (out of
over 128k Baseline) in the 1M graph. Interestingly, with increasing
tendency of items to go viral (i.e. increasing msp), even the absolute
number of displayed fake items decreases. The relative decrease
effect is not due to an absolute increase for Baseline. Instead, it is
due to a higher msp value ensuring more spreading of (both true and
fake) news items in our UCR creation phase. This in turn produces
better UCRs, increasing Credulix’ effectiveness.
4.4 CREDULIX Overhead
In this experiment, we evaluate Credulix’ impact on user opera-
tions’ (viewing and sharing) throughput and latency. We present
our results for four workloads, each corresponding to a value of
msp discussed above (Figures 5 and 6). The four workloads are
summarized in Table 1. We present results for two social graph
sizes: 41M users, and 1M users, with 16 worker threads serving
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Figure 7: Credulix’s throughput overhead
user operations, showing that the Credulix’s overhead in terms of
throughput and latency is low.
Figure 7 shows the throughput comparison between Credulix
and Baseline, for the four workloads. The throughput penalty
caused by Credulix is at most 8%. The impact on throughput is
predominantly caused by Credulix’ background tasks, as detailed
in Section 3. Moreover, Credulix does not add significant overhead
relative to the Baseline as the graph size increases. The throughput
differences between the two graph sizes are not larger than 10%.
This is due to our design which relies on selective item tracking.
Figures 8 and 9 show view and share latencies for the 94% views
and 99.9% views workloads, respectively. The latency values for the
two other workloads are similar and we omit them for brevity.
For the 41M User Twitter graph, the average and 90th percentile
latencies are roughly the same for Credulix and for Baseline. We
notice, however, heavier fluctuations for the 1MUser graph. Overall,
latency increases by at most 17%, at the 90th percentile, while the
median latency is the same for both operations, for both systems,
for both graphs (4 microseconds per operation). The low overhead
in latency is due to Credulix keeping its computation outside the
critical path. Standard deviation of latencies is high both for the
Baseline and for Credulix, for both share and view operations.
The high variation in latency is caused by the intrinsic differences
between the users; for instance, share operations of a user with
more followers need to propagate to more users than posts of users
with few or no followers.
The high 99th percentile latency for both systems results from
Twissandra (our Baseline) being implemented in Java, a language
(in)famous for its garbage collection breaks. Certain operations,
during which garbage collection is performed by the JVM, thus
experience very high latencies. This effect is not inherent to the
system itself, but is caused by the Java implementation and can be
avoided by using a language with explicit memory management.
msp Value % Views, % Shares
1/8 94% Views, 6% Shares
1/16 97% Views, 3% Shares
1/32 99% Views, 1% Shares
1/64 99.9% Views, 0.1% Shares
Table 1: Workload Characteristics. The only parameter we
vary is msp, from which the view/share ratio follows.
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Figure 9: Credulix’s latency overhead: 99.9% views
The impact of garbage collection is stronger with Credulix than
with Baseline, asCredulix creates more short-lived objects in mem-
ory to orchestrate its background tasks. In addition to the intrinsic
differences between users discussed above, garbage collection also
significantly contributes to the high standard deviation observed
in all latencies.
5 DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
We believe thatCredulix is a good step towards addressing the fake
news problem, but we do not claim it to be the ultimate solution.
Credulix is one of many possible layers of protection against
fake news and can be used independently of other mechanisms.
With Credulix in place, news items can still be analyzed based
on content using other algorithms. It is the combination of several
approaches that can create a strong defense against the fake news
phenomenon. This section discusses the limitations of Credulix.
News Propagation. Credulix does not prevent users from ac-
tively pulling any (including fake) news stories directly from their
sources. Credulix identifies fake news on a social media platform
and, if used as we suggest, prevents users from being notified about
other users sharing fake news items.
Manual Fact-Checking.Credulix relies onmanual fact-checking
and thus can only be as good as the fact-checkers. Only users who
have been exposed to manually fact-checked items can be leveraged
by Credulix. However, fact-checking a small number of popular
news items is sufficient to obtain enough users with usable UCRs.
Fact-checking a small number of news items is feasible, especially
given the recent upsurge of fact-checking initiatives [6–10].
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User Behavior. Credulix’s algorithm is based on the assumption
that among those users exposed to fact-checked news items, some
share more fake items than others. Analogous assumptions are
commonly used in other contexts such as recommender systems.
For example, a user-based recommender systemwould not be useful
if all users behaved the same way, i.e. everybody giving the same
ratings to the same items. Note that, even in the case where all
users did behave the same, running Credulixwould not negatively
impact the behavior of the system: Credulix would not detect
any fake news items, nor would it classify fake news items as
true. Our approach shines when the inclination of most users to
share fake news does not change too quickly over time. Looking at
social media today, some people seem indeed to consciously and
consistently spread more fake news than others [14–16]. In fact,
many systems that are being successfully applied in practice (e.g.
reputation systems, or systems based on collaborative filtering)
fundamentally rely on this same assumption.
Malicious Attacks. The assumption that users do not change their
behavior too quickly could, however, potentially be exploited by a
malicious adversary. Such an adversary controlling many machine-
operated user accounts could deceive the system by breaking this
assumption. For example, all accounts controlled by the adversary
could be sharing only true reviewed news items for an extended
period of time and then suddenly share an un-reviewed fake one
(or do the opposite, if the goal is to prevent a truthful news item
from being disseminated). Even then, a successful attack would
only enable the spread of the news item, without guaranteeing its
virality. Moreover, the adversary runs a risk that the fake item will
later be fact-checked and thus will appear in their UCRs, reducing
the chances of repeating this attack with another fake item. In fact,
the more popular such an item becomes (which is the likely goal of
the adversary), the higher the chance of it being fact-checked. The
trade-off between false positives and false negatives is expressed
by the p0 parameter (see Section 2), i.e. the certainty required to
flag an item as fake. A high value of p0 might make it easier for the
adversary to “smuggle” fake items in the system, but makes it more
difficult to prevent true news items from spreading.
Updating of the Ground Truth. Like any vaccine, Credulix re-
lies on a fraction of fake news to exist in the social network in order
to be efficient. If Credulix stops the fake news from becoming
viral, then the system might lack the ground truth to make future
predictions. Hence, there might be periods when fake news can
appear again. To avoid such fluctuations, Credulix’ ground truth
should be continuously updated with some of the most current
fake news items. Credulix’ evolution in time, including changes
in user behavior as well as updating of the ground truth related to
system dynamics, are research directions we are considering for
future work.
Filtering News. One could argue that removing some news items
from users’ news feeds might be seen as a limitation, even as a
form of censorship. But social media already take that liberty as
they display to users only about 10% of the news that they could
show. Rather than censorship, Credulix should be viewed as an
effort to ensure the highest possible quality of the items displayed,
considering the credibility of an item to be one of the quality criteria.
6 RELATEDWORK
Credulix shares similarities with reputation systems [46, 61, 63], in
creating profiles for users (UCRs in Credulix) and in assuming that
the future behavior of users will be similar to their past behavior. In
our approach, however, users are not rated directly by other users.
Instead, we compute users’ UCRs based on their reaction to what
we consider ground truth (fact-checked items).
Credulix also resembles recommender systems [23, 24, 29, 32,
48, 53, 54, 58, 62, 65] in the sense that it pre-selects items for users
to see. Unlike in recommender systems, however, the pre-selection
is independent of the requesting user. Our goal is not to provide a
personalized selection.
Another approach to detect fake news is to automatically check
content [28]. Content analysis can also help detectmachine-generated
fake blogs [47] or social spam using many popular tags for irrele-
vant content [56]. Another line of research has been motivated by
the role of social networks for news dissemmination in the case of
catastrophic events such as hurricanes and earthquakes[38, 42].
News item credibility can also be inferred by applying machine
learning techniques [30], by using a set of reliable content as a
training set [64], or by analyzing a set of predetermined features
[37]. Other parameters of interest are linguistic quantifiers [69],
swear words, pronouns or emoticons [36]. Yet, a malicious agent
knowing these specific features could use them to spread fake news.
Following the events of 2016, Facebook received much media
attention concerning their politics about “fake news”. Their first
aproach was to assess news sources reliability in a centralized way
[17]. Recently, Facebook launched community-based assesment ex-
periment [18]: asking the users to evaluate the reliability of various
news sources. The idea is to give more exposure to news sources
that are “broadly trusted”’. Our approach is finer-grained and goes
to the level of news items. Facebook also used third-party fact
checkers to look at articles flagged by users.
Dispute Finder [31] also takes a community approach asking
users not only to flag claims they believe to be disputed, but also to
link the disputed claim to a reliable source that refutes it. Credulix,
does not look at concrete claims, but infers the trustworthiness of
news items based on user behavior.
Fact-checking tools can help to annotate documents and to cre-
ate knowledge bases [20, 21, 33, 59, 60]. Automated verification of
claims about structured data, or finding interesting claims that can
be made over a given set of data has been researched as well [41, 70].
These tools facilitate the fact-checking process that Credulix relies
on, but by themselves do not prevent the spreading of fake news.
Curb [44], is algorithm that is close to Credulix in several aspects.
Like Credulix, it leverages the crowd to detect and reduce the
spread of fake news and misinformation and assumes a very similar
user behavior model. Curb, however, focuses on the problem of
which items to fact-check and when, relying on users to manually
flag items. Curb only prevents the spreading of items that have
been fact-checked. In addition, it assumes fact-checking to happen
instantaneously, i.e., a fake item selected for fact-checking by Curb
is assumed to stop spreading immediately, without taking into ac-
count the considerable fact-checking delay. Credulix could benefit
from Curb by using it as a fact-checking module.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
We presented Credulix, the first content-agnostic system to detect
and limit the spread of fake news on social networks with a very
small performance overhead. Using a Bayesian approach, Credulix
learns from human fact-checking to compute the probability of
falsehood of news items, based on who shared them. Applied to
a real-world social network of 41M users, Credulix prevents the
vast majority (over 99%) of fake news items from becoming viral,
with no false positives.
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